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Tying and Entry Deterrence in Vertically Differentiated Markets
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Kovác, Eugen |
| Copyright Year | 2005 |
| Abstract | This paper analyzes tying and bundling as an entry deterrence tool. It shows that a multi-product firm can defend its monopoly position in one market via tying even when it does not have market power in another market. This is shown on a model with two complementary goods, each of which is vertically differentiated and in which consumers’ preferences for the goods are positively correlated. Some possible ways of defending against entry deterrence, and implications for competition policy, are discussed. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.870249 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.uni-bonn.de/~kovac/papers/bundling_kovac2.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.fep.up.pt/conferences/earie2005/cd_rom/Session%20II/II.F/kovac.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.870249 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
