Splitting The Baby In Two: How To Solve Solomon'S Dilemma When Agents Are Boundedly Rational

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Ponti, Giovanni
Copyright Year	2000
Abstract	We study the dynamic implementation of the first-best for King Solomon's Dilemma, on the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics, and also with best-reply dynamics. We find that, although the mechanisms proposed by the literature are dynamically implementable with best-reply dynamics, the same does not hold when monotonic dynamics are considered. To solve this problem, we propose an alternative mechanism, whose game-form is still implementable in the traditional sense. However, it is also dynamically implementable, as every interior path of the adjustment pro-cesses we consider converges to the first-best, which is also asymptotically stable.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	1
Page Count	1
File Format	PDF HTM / HTML
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://web2011.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2000-08.pdf
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article