Apes, Language, and the Human Mind, by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Stuart G. Shanker and Talbot J. Taylor

Content Provider	Semantic Scholar
Author	Mitchell, Robert W.
Copyright Year	1999
Abstract	Oxford University Press, 1998. £22.50 / $29.95 (vii + 244 pages)ISBN 0 19 510986 4In 1927, comparative psychologists studied a dog, Fellow, who, according to his owner, understood English ‘in much the same manner as a child under the same circumstances would’ (Ref. 1xThe sensory capacities and intelligence of dogs, with a report on the ability of the noted dog ‘Fellow’ to respond to verbal stimuli. Warden, C.J. and Warner, L.H. Q. Rev. Biol. 1928; 3: 1–28CrossrefSee all ReferencesRef. 1, p. 17). Fellow had ‘been talked to constantly almost from birth in much the same manner as a young child during the years of taking on language’, and had never been ‘trained’ to respond to English. With double-blind tests it was discovered that Fellow understood over 50 English requests. Looking at the evidence today, however, no one would claim that Fellow ‘understood English,’ because comprehension of syntax was never tested.Apes, Language, and the Human Mind reports on a bonobo chimpanzee, Kanzi, ‘the first animal ever to learn language without training, as a child does, and thus the first to truly understand a spoken human language’ (p. 6). The evidence (better portrayed elsewhere2xLanguage comprehension in ape and child. Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S. et al. Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Dev. 1993; 58PubMedSee all References) for Kanzi’s English comprehension is more impressive than that for Fellow, and Kanzi is reasonably described as having comprehension of English syntax in response to various requests, comparable to that of the two-year-old child who was similarly tested.Unfortunately, various recalcitrant linguists contest Kanzi’s English comprehension (usually Steven Pinker and Joel Wallman; see p. 116). This book is a response to these linguists, to persuade them to realize the error of their interpretations. I doubt it will be successful.The authors’ plan to convince linguists is to indicate that normal English usage of words like ‘comprehension’, ‘pretense’ and ‘empathy’ are perfectly appropriate to apply to Kanzi’s behavior, given that we have no better evidence of the applicability of these terms when used to describe humans. We are warned in Chapter 3 that ‘the claims [Sue Savage-Rumbaugh] makes about Kanzi’s behavior and abilities must be seen – if we are to make sense of them – as emergent properties of the lived story that is partially recounted in that narrative: not as sui generis propositional atoms’ (p. 177). In other words, in the story about Kanzi that is used to describe and understand him in everyday interaction, these words make sense. Any desire to evaluate the evidence of these terms (other than by looking at all available videotaped evidence to see if the terms are used normatively) is a ‘rhetorical compulsion’ which is best avoided, a compulsion left over from Descartes’ depiction of animals as machines that only seem to act like humans. Savage-Rumbaugh, from her experience with Kanzi, is currently the best available witness to Kanzi’s behavior, and therefore the best interpreter. (Similarly, if we take this view, Fellow’s owner was the best available witness to Fellow’s behavior, and therefore the best interpreter.) Surprisingly, we are never provided with actual norms for Kanzi. Savage-Rumbaugh’s normative uses of psychological words to characterize Kanzi is viewed as a scientific revolution, yet exactly this interpretational method has been a mainstay for over two decades of Patterson’s (unmentioned) work with signing gorillas. A similar ‘cultural anthropological’ approach has been used in Miles’ (also unmentioned) work with a signing orang-utan. Oddly, the authors’ interpretational technique is not employed in Chapter 4 when they evaluate other ape-language studies. They exhibit their own ‘rhetorical compulsion’ to ask for evidence beyond the narrative supplied by scientists, and they accept Savage-Rumbaugh’s critiques as the best interpretation. It seems the authors want it both ways – we must accept their interpretations on faith, but not the interpretations by others.From the beginning, we are told that Kanzi is an ape who has acquired ‘linguistic and cognitive skills far beyond those achieved by any other non-human animal in previous research’ (p. v). I had just the opposite feelings about the findings: everything here was consistent with other accounts of apes, especially human-reared ones, who show speech comprehension, gestural-sign invention, self-talk, meaningful word combination, maternal tolerance, (limited) empathic responses, attention to another’s wounds, pointing to their own pain, cooperation with doctors, pretense with toys and imaginary objects, bodily imitation, deception, concealment, planning, and self-recognition3xScientific and popular conceptions of the psychology of great apes from the 1790s to the 1970s: deja vu all over again. Mitchell, R.W. Primate Report. 1999; 53: 1–118See all References. Strangely, statements later in Chapter 1 contradict the initial claims that bonobos are more like humans than are chimpanzees, that bonobo vocalizations are easily understood by humans, that apes have difficulty with gestures, and that each English sentence was uttered only once in Kanzi’s comprehension tests. We are also told that work with Kanzi represents a ‘scientific breakthrough’ (p. v), yet the methods used to test for English comprehension – double-blind requests for actions with objects – were the same as those used with Fellow.Elaborate everyday experience with any organism can provide novel insights, but this does not indicate that people must simply accept eyewitness testimony based on everyday experience4xAnthropomorphic anecdotalism as method. Mitchell, R.W. : 151–169See all References. The authors provide reasonable evidence for language comprehension in Kanzi, but other researchers are within their rights to offer different accounts, which can then be examined. That the authors are opposed to alternative interpretations is surprising – disagreement is frustrating, but that’s how science works5xThe Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science. Collins, H. and Pinch, T. See all References. The study of Kanzi’s comprehension is fascinating, in part because it creates so many interesting questions about the extent of his synactic and cognitive abilities and their similarity to human abilities. If the interpretational method proposed by the authors is used, there is no reason to ask these questions – it is already true that Kanzi comprehends English just like a two-year-old child. Kanzi’s research project has received extensive funding, and the findings have been repeatedly published, so it is not clear that critics have had a negative impact. Why shouldn’t Pinker and Wallman, those critics who ‘refuse to be convinced’ have their say, even if the authors don’t find their arguments particularly compelling?
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DOI	10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01308-X
Volume Number	3
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Alternate Webpage(s)	https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613%2899%2901308-X
Journal	Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Language	English
Access Restriction	Open
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article