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Sophisticated Behavior under Majoritarian and Non-Majoritarian Voting Procedures
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Yuval, Fany Herne, Kaisa |
| Copyright Year | 2005 |
| Abstract | This study addresses the issue of sincere and sophisticated voting under majoritarian and non-majoritarian voting procedures. By conducting experimental voting games, we compared a common majoritarian procedure, Plurality Voting (PV) with a non-majoritarian procedure, Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV). We focused on two different aspects of the subject: the likelihood of sophisticated voting under each one of the voting procedures and the conditions that foster sincere and sophisticated voting under these procedures. The results highlighted the significant differences between majoritarian and non-majoritarian voting procedures as a key factor in determining the tendency of voters to use sincere or sophisticated voting. Clearly, the sincere model was dominant in SVV games while sophisticated voting dominated the PV games. The extent of sophisticated voting ran counter to the group size, a tendency that was stronger under SVV than under PV. By demonstrating the advantages of the minority principle, when voters are small in number, we hope to encourage the development of a solution that will enable the use of SVV in general elections. |
| Starting Page | 217 |
| Ending Page | 237 |
| Page Count | 21 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11109-005-4221-z |
| Volume Number | 27 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/41399/Paper-260.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-005-4221-z |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
