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Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas.
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Henrich, Joseph D. Boyd, Robert |
| Copyright Year | 2001 |
| Abstract | In this paper, we present a cultural evolutionary model in which norms for cooperation and punishment are acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission-a tendency to copy the most successful individual; and (2) conformist transmission-a tendency to copy the most frequent behavior in the population. We first show that if a finite number of punishment stages is permitted (e.g. two stages of punishment occur if some individuals punish people who fail to punish non-cooperators), then an arbitrarily small amount of conformist transmission will stabilize cooperative behavior by stabilizing punishment at some n -th stage. We then explain how, once cooperation is stabilized in one group, it may spread through a multi-group population via cultural group selection. Finally, once cooperation is prevalent, we show how prosocial genes favoring cooperation and punishment may invade in the wake of cultural group selection. |
| Starting Page | 79 |
| Ending Page | 89 |
| Page Count | 11 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 |
| PubMed reference number | 11162054 |
| Journal | Medline |
| Volume Number | 208 |
| Issue Number | 1 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/boyd/HenrichBoydJTB2001_Clean.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/Website/Papers/coopct.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://henrich.fas.harvard.edu/files/henrich/files/henrich_boyd_2001.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 |
| Journal | Journal of theoretical biology |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
