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Experimental comparison between markets on dynamic permit trading and investment in irreversible abatement with and without non-regulated companies
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Taschini, Luca Chesney, Marc Wang, Mei |
| Copyright Year | 2014 |
| Abstract | This paper examines the investment strategies of compliance companies in irreversible abatement technologies and the environmental achievements of the system in an inter-temporal cap-and-trade market using laboratory experiments. The experimental analysis is performed under varying market structures: firstly, in a market that is exclusive to compliance companies and subsequently, in a market that is open to both compliance and non-compliance entities. In line with theoretical models on irreversible abatement investment, the paper shows that regulated companies trade permits at a premium. Also, steep per unit penalties for excess emissions prompt early investments in irreversible abatement technologies. Further, the paper shows that by contributing to the permit demand and supply, non-compliance companies (i) enhance the exchange of permits, helping the system to achieve a zero-excess permit position, (ii) increase the price levels, but has no apparent effect on price variability. |
| Starting Page | 23 |
| Ending Page | 50 |
| Page Count | 28 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11149-013-9238-3 |
| Volume Number | 46 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WP41_markets-emissions-permits.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.cccep.ac.uk/Publications/Working-papers/Papers/50-59/WP51_tech-markets-emissions-permits.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-013-9238-3 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |