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Collective action as a social exchange
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Gächter, Simon Fehr, Ernst |
| Copyright Year | 1999 |
| Abstract | Abstract Social interactions are frequently associated with social approval. Anticipation of social sanctions may have important economic consequences, in particular in the realm of collective action and voluntary cooperation. This paper investigates the impact and the limitations of social rewards on people’s behavior in the provision of a public good. We examine whether the opportunity to receive social approval in exchange for participation in collective actions is capable of overcome free-riding. We find that approval incentives alone are not sufficiently strong to cause a reduction in free-riding. However, in combination with some minimal social familiarity approval incentives generate a significant rise in cooperation. Our results also suggest that approval incentives give rise to multiple equilibria. |
| Starting Page | 341 |
| Ending Page | 369 |
| Page Count | 29 |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00045-1 |
| Volume Number | 39 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-9758-127f-ffff-ffffa53c7471/CollectiveActionasaAocialExchange.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.iew.uzh.ch/institute/people/fehr/publications/CollectiveActionasaAocialExchange.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/fehr/publications/CollectiveActionasaAocialExchange.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681%2899%2900045-1 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
