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Quantity-Discount Contracts as a Barrier to Entry
| Content Provider | Semantic Scholar |
|---|---|
| Author | Beard, Thomas Randolph Ford, George S. Spiwak, Lawrence J. |
| Copyright Year | 2004 |
| Abstract | This POLICY PAPER presents an economic model showing how incumbent local exchange carriers may deter efficient facilities-based entry for high capacity loop facilities through the use of quantity-discount contracts for Special Access services. Since efficient entry is deterred, these contracts are socially inefficient. The theoretical model also shows that the entry-deterring effects of the contracts are eliminated if high-capacity circuits are made available at prices based on economic costs (e.g., TELRIC) and made available without use restrictions historically applied to such access. To foster efficient facilities-based entry, federal policies must address the entry-deterring components of Special Access contracts and make high-capacity facilities available on an unbundled basis at cost-based prices. |
| File Format | PDF HTM / HTML |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.644603 |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | http://www.phoenix-center.org/pcpp/PCPP20Final.pdf |
| Alternate Webpage(s) | https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.644603 |
| Language | English |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
