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PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Carvalho, Felipe Nogueira De |
| Copyright Year | 2020 |
| Description | Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and non-attentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts. |
| Related Links | http://www.scielo.br/pdf/man/v43n2/2317-630X-man-43-02-16.pdf |
| Ending Page | 53 |
| Page Count | 38 |
| Starting Page | 16 |
| ISSN | 01006045 |
| e-ISSN | 01006045 |
| DOI | 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n2.fc |
| Journal | Manuscrito |
| Issue Number | 2 |
| Volume Number | 43 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | FapUNIFESP (SciELO) |
| Publisher Date | 2020-06-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Manuscrito Cybernetical Science Demonstrative Thought Object Perception Object Representation |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Philosophy |