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| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Mekonnen, Teddy |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal In this paper, I study the welfare effects of adverse selection and congestion in search markets. There is a large mass of agents (e.g., firms) with homogeneous preferences and a relatively smaller mass of objects (e.g., workers) that differ in quality. Agents search for objects either through random or directed search. Random search — agents are randomly matched to an object of any quality — gives rise to adverse selection, while directed search — agents choose with which quality types to match — gives rise to congestion. When utility is either non-transferable or transferable through Nash bargaining, I show that random search dominates directed search in terms of welfare, even though each agent would prefer to be able to direct her search. |
| Related Links | https://authors.library.caltech.edu/96008/1/Search-1.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3275771 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3275771 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2018-12-02 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Operations Research and Management Science Adverse Selection |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |