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Pecuniary Externalities, Bank Overleverage, and Macroeconomic Fragility
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Kato, Ryo Tsuruga, Takayuki |
| Copyright Year | 2020 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Pecuniary externalities in models with financial friction justify macroprudential policies for preventing economic agents’ excessive risk taking. We extend the Diamond and Rajan (2012) model of banks with the production factors and explore how a pecuniary externality affects a bank’s leverage. We show that the laissez-faire banks in our model take on excessive risks compared with the constrained social optimum. Our numerical simulations suggest that the crisis probability is 2-3 percentage points higher in the laissez-faire economy than in the constrained social optimum. |
| Related Links | https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1078.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3551826 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3551826 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2020-03-09 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Agricultural Economics Financial Crisis Liquidity Shortage Maturity Mismatch |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |