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Debtholder Monitoring Incentives and Bank Earnings Opacity
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Danisewicz, Piotr McGowan, Danny Onali, Enrico Schaeck, Klaus |
| Copyright Year | 2020 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal We exploit exogenous legislative changes that alter the priority structure of different classes of debt to study how debtholder monitoring incentives affect bank earnings opacity. We present novel evidence that exposing nondepositors to greater losses in bankruptcy reduces bank earnings opacity, especially for banks with larger shares of nondeposit funding, listed banks, and independent banks. The reduction in earnings opacity is driven by a lower propensity to overstate earnings and becomes larger during crises, when the incentive to conceal capital shortfalls is stronger. Our findings highlight the importance of creditors’ monitoring incentives in improving the quality of information disclosure. |
| Related Links | https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/files/220185351/DPL_12_OCT_JFQA.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3525766 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3525766 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2020-01-26 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Debtholder Monitoring Incentives Bank Earnings Opacity Earnings Management Debt Structure |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |