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Opaque Selling
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Anderson, Simon P. Celik, Levent |
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal We study "opaque" selling in multiproduct environments - a marketing practice in which sellers strategically withhold product information by keeping important characteristics of their products hidden until after purchase. We show that a monopolist will always use opaque selling, but it is not first-best optimal to do so. However, opaque selling might be used at the constrained optimum (with the monopolist's pricing behavior taken as given). For linear disutility costs, it is optimal for a monopolist to offer a single opaque product. |
| Related Links | https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/23597/1/Opaque_rev_021219.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3521450 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3521450 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2019-12-02 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Operations Research and Management Science Opaque Products Product Line Design Product Differentiation Price Discrimination |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |