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Dynamic Many-to-One Matching
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Altinok, Ahmet |
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: Can we analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one market? First, we provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second, we showthat if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are “inferior” to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, we extend the model to allow agents on one side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension,we provide a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the US medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system. |
| Related Links | https://ideas.repec.org/jmp/2019/pal868.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3526522 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3526522 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2019-11-04 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Operations Research and Management Science Matching Market Join the Market |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |
