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Moral Hazard and Horizontal Information
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Papanastasiou, Anastasios I. |
| Copyright Year | 2017 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal This paper examines a moral hazard problem where the principal observes a location signal of the agent's unobserved effort. When the agent incurs costlier effort the demand for the agent's services is ex-ante more spread out over a location measure of demand. If location outcomes are informative about the agents action and verifiable, the principal can improve efficiency by contracting on such information. The introduction of location information suggests that the optimal contract that maximizes expected market size can be locally decreasing in sales when small-market location outcomes are a strong signal of high effort. |
| Related Links | http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/McMasterEconWP2017-10.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=2994963 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.2994963 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2017-06-27 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Moral Hazard Moral Position Market Size |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |