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Collusion in Two-Sided Markets
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Lefouili, Yassine Pinho, Joana |
| Copyright Year | 2017 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal This paper explores the incentives for, and the effects of, collusion in prices between two-sided platforms. We characterize the most profitable sustainable agreement when platforms collude on both sides of the market and when they collude on a single side of the market. Under two-sided collusion, prices on both sides are higher than competitive prices, implying that agents on both sides become worse off as compared to the competitive outcome. An increase in cross-group externalities makes two-sided collusion at a given profit level harder to sustain, and reduces the harm from collusion suffered by the agents on a given side as long as the collusive price on that side is lower than the monopoly price. When platforms collude on a single side of the market, the price on the collusive side is lower (higher) than the competitive price if the magnitude of the cross-group externalities exerted on that side is sufficiently large (small). As a result, one-sided collusion may benefit the agents on the collusive side and harm the agents on the competitive side. |
| Related Links | http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/25859/1/wp_tse_894.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3049356 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3049356 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2017-09-30 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Two-sided Markets Cross-group Externalities |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |
