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Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Procurement
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Gretschko, Vitali Pollrich, Martin |
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Description | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state are infeasible. We show that contractual incompleteness comes without a cost. The buyer achieves the same surplus with complete and incomplete contracts. The key insight is that the allocation prescribed by optimal complete contracts is sequentially optimal with incomplete contracts if the buyer does not receive too much information ex-interim. We show that the English auction restricts the information optimally. |
| Related Links | https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/53178/1/dp19040.pdf https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=3466701 |
| ISSN | 10914358 |
| e-ISSN | 15565068 |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3466701 |
| Journal | SSRN Electronic Journal |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV |
| Publisher Date | 2019-01-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal Incomplete Contracts Repeated Relationships |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health Psychiatry and Mental Health |