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Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Bourget, David |
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Description | This paper asks whether phenomenal intentionality (intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone) has a relational structure of the sort envisaged in Russell's theory of acquaintance. I put forward three arguments in favor of a relational view: one phenomenological, one linguistic, and one based on the view's ability to account for the truth conditions of phenomenally intentional states. I then consider several objections to the relational view. The chief objection takes the form of a dilemma between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the properties constitutive of the contents of phenomenal intentional states on this view: the Aristotelian view seems unable to account for all the apparent contents of phenomenal intentional states, but the Platonic view seems to be ontologically unacceptable. I also consider other objections from physicalism, phenomenology, and epistemology. Book Name: Sensations, Thoughts, Language |
| Related Links | https://philpapers.org/archive/BOURVA.pdf https://api.taylorfrancis.com/content/chapters/edit/download?identifierName=doi&identifierValue=10.4324/9781351017435-7&type=chapterpdf |
| Ending Page | 166 |
| Page Count | 30 |
| Starting Page | 137 |
| DOI | 10.4324/9781351017435-7 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited |
| Publisher Date | 2019-09-30 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Book Name: Sensations, Thoughts, Language History and Philosophy of Science Phenomenal Intentionality Relational View Aristotelian Envisaged Unacceptable Epistemology Constitutive Forward |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Chapter |