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Believing Badly
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | McCormick, Miriam Schleifer |
| Copyright Year | 2020 |
| Description | This chapter will argue that if one wants to hold on to the idea of there being doxastic duties, they cannot be merely or purely epistemic. It is generally accepted that if one violates a duty, one is subject to blame. If one is criticized only because one's doxastic attitude does not, for example, conform to the evidence, blame is rarely the appropriate reaction. If epistemic norms are taken as entirely distinct from moral or practical ones, then the kind of criticism appropriate when they are violated is of the same kind as when the norms of etiquette are violated. That is, the criticism is limited to a narrow domain and in such domains blame is not warranted. There are times when believing in certain ways is blameworthy, and this is when to believe as one does requires violating norms that are not merely epistemic. This chapter will further argue that such cases are rare. The kind of reproach appropriate in the doxastic realm does not usually stem from a violation of duties. Rather, reproachable believing is usually taken to reveal flawed agency. Book Name: Epistemic Duties |
| Related Links | https://api.taylorfrancis.com/content/chapters/edit/download?identifierName=doi&identifierValue=10.4324/9780429030215-4&type=chapterpdf |
| Ending Page | 43 |
| Page Count | 15 |
| Starting Page | 29 |
| DOI | 10.4324/9780429030215-4 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited |
| Publisher Date | 2020-10-11 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Book Name: Epistemic Duties History and Philosophy of Science Philosophy Conform Epistemic Doxastic Duties Chapter Will Argue Reproachable Believing Blameworthy |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Chapter |
