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PRINCIPLE, PRACTICE, AND PRECEDENT: VINDICATING JUSTICE, ACCORDING TO LAW
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Allan, T. R. S. |
| Copyright Year | 2018 |
| Description | Legal judgment, I argue, entails moral judgment; legal obligations, correctly identified, are genuine moral obligations. Dworkin's legal theory is instructive, but problematic: his account of integrity fails to provide a convincing reconciliation of practice and principle. We can, however, defend a superior account in which the moral ideals that we invoke to justify legal practice – affirming its legitimacy under certain conditions – retain their force throughout our judgments about its specific demands in particular cases. Common law reasoning exemplifies that approach, reflecting the interdependence of practice and principle. It is an internal, interpretative inquiry, drawing on the moral resources of our own tradition, treated as an influential guide to the requirements of justice. The law is constituted, accordingly, neither by its socially authoritative sources, whatever their merits, nor by the moraleffectsof our legal practice. It is rather the scheme of justice we construct in our continuing efforts to bring our practice closer to the ideals that inspire and redeem it. |
| Related Links | https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/215A60B74D9EA32A57E16069A0305751/S0008197318000405a.pdf/div-class-title-principle-practice-and-precedent-vindicating-justice-according-to-law-div.pdf |
| Ending Page | 297 |
| Page Count | 29 |
| Starting Page | 269 |
| ISSN | 00081973 |
| e-ISSN | 14692139 |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0008197318000405 |
| Journal | The Cambridge Law Journal |
| Issue Number | 2 |
| Volume Number | 77 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) |
| Publisher Date | 2018-07-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | The Cambridge Law Journal Judicial Precedent Common Law Adjudication Interpretative Legal Reasoning Greenberg's Moral Impact Theory |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Law |
