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No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | Eronen, Markus I. |
| Copyright Year | 2013 |
| Description | I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that apparent cases of downward causation can be analyzed away. |
| Related Links | https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/62438349/No_Levels_No_Problems.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/849A1116A503C6C9AD25F53C96CA4357/S0031824800006589a.pdf/div-class-title-no-levels-no-problems-downward-causation-in-neuroscience-div.pdf |
| Ending Page | 1052 |
| Page Count | 11 |
| Starting Page | 1042 |
| ISSN | 00318248 |
| e-ISSN | 1539767X |
| DOI | 10.1086/673898 |
| Journal | Philosophy of Science |
| Issue Number | 5 |
| Volume Number | 80 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) |
| Publisher Date | 2013-12-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Philosophy of Science Downward Causation |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Philosophy History History and Philosophy of Science |
