IS IT ALWAYS RATIONAL TO SATISFY SAVAGE'S AXIOMS?

Content Provider	Scilit
Author	Gilboa, Itzhak Postlewaite, Andrew Schmeidler, David
Copyright Year	2009
Description	This note argues that, under some circumstances, it is more rational not to behave in accordance with a Bayesian prior than to do so. The starting point is that in the absence of information, choosing a prior is arbitrary. If the prior is to have meaningful implications, it is more rational to admit that one does not have sufficient information to generate a prior than to pretend that one does. This suggests a view of rationality that requires a compromise between internal coherence and justification, similarly to compromises that appear in moral dilemmas. Finally, it is argued that Savage's axioms are more compelling when applied to a naturally given state space than to an analytically constructed one; in the latter case, it may be more rational to violate the axioms than to be Bayesian.
Related Links	http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275722/files/3-2009.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/887C07F3AE08945A7C44A4CD18B792AD/S0266267109990241a.pdf/div-class-title-is-it-always-rational-to-satisfy-savage-s-axioms-div.pdf
Ending Page	296
Page Count	12
Starting Page	285
ISSN	02662671
e-ISSN	14740028
DOI	10.1017/s0266267109990241
Journal	Economics and Philosophy
Issue Number	3
Volume Number	25
Language	English
Publisher	Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publisher Date	2009-11-01
Access Restriction	Open
Subject Keyword	Economics and Philosophy
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Philosophy Economics and Econometrics