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Action explanation and its presuppositions
| Content Provider | Scilit |
|---|---|
| Author | O’Brien, Lilian |
| Copyright Year | 2019 |
| Description | In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation. |
| Related Links | https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DF4CCCE9384360BC27D723505F6FF1FA/S0045509100016192a.pdf/div-class-title-action-explanation-and-its-presuppositions-div.pdf |
| Ending Page | 146 |
| Page Count | 24 |
| Starting Page | 123 |
| ISSN | 00455091 |
| e-ISSN | 19110820 |
| DOI | 10.1080/00455091.2018.1518629 |
| Journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
| Issue Number | 1 |
| Volume Number | 49 |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) |
| Publisher Date | 2019-02-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Canadian Journal of Philosophy History and Philosophy of Science Rationalizing Action Explanation Reasons Explanation Davidson's Challenge |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
| Subject | Philosophy |
