NDLI: Parallel demand side auction mechanism for dynamic and efficient resource allocation

Content Provider	IET Digital Library
Author	Wang, Peng Zou, Suli Ma, Zhongjing
Abstract	Effective allocation mechanisms are required for infinitesimally divisible demand side resources capturing self-interest and non-cooperation among the users who consume the resources, in order to achieve efficient resource allocation maximising the social welfare with decentralisation of information sharing and decision making. The authors study an auction based mechanism to allocate the demand side resource, where a set of users who consume resources game with each other by bidding. The proposed auction mechanism fits into the progressive second price (PSP) mechanism, which follows a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves type payment. These kind of mechanisms admit incentive compatibility and existence of the efficient Nash equilibrium (NE). Furthermore, considering the fairness and privacy of the bidders as well as limitation of sequential algorithms in practical applications, the authors present a parallel updating algorithm in which all the bidders synchronously update their bids to achieve the efficient NE. By rigorous theoretical analyses, the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a bid profile which is shown to be the efficient NE. Numerical simulations demonstrate the performance of the proposed auction mechanism and parallel algorithm.
Starting Page	2399
Ending Page	2406
Page Count	8
ISSN	17518644
Volume Number	13
e-ISSN	17518652
Issue Number	Issue 15, Oct (2019)
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/iet-cta/13/15
Alternate Webpage(s)	https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-cta.2018.6392
Journal	IET Control Theory & Applications
Publisher Date	2019-07-02
Access Restriction	Open
Rights Holder	© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Subject Keyword	Auction Mechanism Decision Making Demand Side Resource Effective Allocation Mechanisms Efficient Nash Equilibrium Efficient Resource Allocation Electronic Commerce Game Theory Infinitesimally Divisible Demand Information Sharing Numerical Simulation Optimisation Technique Parallel Algorithm Parallel Demand Parallel Software Parallel Updating Algorithm Pricing Progressive Second Price Mechanism Resource Allocation ReSource Game Self-interest Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Type Payment
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Control and Optimization Control and Systems Engineering Human-Computer Interaction Electrical and Electronic Engineering Computer Science Applications

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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