NDLI: Solving conjectured multi-leader-follower equilibriums for electricity markets with quadratic optimization problems

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Campos, F.A. Villar, J. Diaz, C. Contreras, A.
Copyright Year	2012
Description	Author affiliation: Institute for Research in Technology (IIT), Technical School of Engineering (ICAI), Comillas Pontifical University, Santa Cruz de Marcenado 26, 28015 Madrid, Spain (Campos, F.A.; Villar, J.; Diaz, C.; Contreras, A.)
Abstract	Modeling competition in the future European Electricity Market (EEM) suggests considering new perspectives of leadership between the participant generators. EEM models should then be able to represent the possible existence of leaders and followers, and Conjectural Stackelberg equilibriums could be a powerful approach to do so. These asymmetric equilibriums can represent several types of competitive advantages among the market participants, though existing literature approaches generally assume single-leader-follower games. In addition, the complexity of the resolution methodologies sometimes compromises their applicability, especially if large-scale problems have to be solved. In this paper, a multi-leader-follower conjectural Stackelberg equilibrium model is presented. A simple convex quadratic optimization problem is proposed for its resolution, and the conditions for the equilibrium existence are discussed. A case study is presented to validate the model, and to analyze how market competition changes with the number of leaders or followers. The main conclusion is that if leadership spreads and Stackelberg models are used for its representation, regulatory policies should be oriented to increase the number of followers. However, there exists a maximum number of followers for which Stackelberg equilibriums does not exist, suggesting a deeper analysis for these cases to understand that matter and to decide the possible use of other market models.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	7
File Size	204240
Page Count	7
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781467308342
e-ISBN	9781467308335
e-ISBN	9781467308328
DOI	10.1109/EEM.2012.6254667
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2012-05-10
Publisher Place	Italy
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Stackelberg Equilibrium Existence Conditions Europe Multi-Leader Equilibrium Lead Quadratic Optimization Electricity supply industry Cost function Generators Equations Electricity Markets Nash-Conjectural Equilibrium
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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