NDLI: Influence modelling using bounded rationality in social networks

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Kasthurirathna, Dharshana Harre, Michael Piraveenan, Mahendra
Copyright Year	2015
Description	Author affiliation: Complex Systems Research group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006 Australia (Kasthurirathna, Dharshana; Harre, Michael; Piraveenan, Mahendra)
Abstract	Influence models enable the modelling of the spread of ideas, opinions and behaviours in social networks. Bounded rationality in social network suggests that players make non optimum decisions due to the limitations of access to information. Based on the premise that adopting a state or an idea can be regarded as being ‘rational’, we propose an influence model based on the heterogeneous bounded rationality of players in a social network. We employ the quantal response equilibrium model to incorporate the bounded rationality in the context of social influence. The bounded rationality of following a seed or adopting the strategy of a seed would be negatively proportional to the distance from that node. This indicates that the closeness centrality would be the appropriate measure to place influencers in a social network. We argue that this model can be used in scenarios where there are multiple types of influencers and varying payoffs of adopting a state. We compare different seed placement mechanisms to compare and contrast the optimum method to minimise the existing social influence in a network when there are multiple and conflicting seeds. We ascertain that placing of opposing seeds according to a measure derived from a combination of the betweenness centrality values from the seeds and the closeness centrality of the network would provide the maximum negative influence.
Starting Page	33
Ending Page	40
File Size	468756
Page Count	8
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781450338547
DOI	10.1145/2808797.2808886
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2015-08-25
Publisher Place	France
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. (ACM)
Subject Keyword	Analytical models Social network services Games Nash equilibrium Australia Complex systems
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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