NDLI: Co-Opetitive Contracting in Service Value Networks

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Blau, B. Conte, T.
Copyright Year	2011
Abstract	Based on the graph-based Vickrey auction in service value networks introduced by Blau et al. [1], we analyze strategic behavior of service providers in networked formations regarding their opportunities to foster bilateral cooperative agreements. Introducing enforceable ex-ante agreements between adjacent service providers in a Service Value Network (SVNs), we investigate beneficial investment strategies that aim at reducing communication cost between sequentially composed services. The contribution at hand is twofold: Based on the foundation of SVNs and the efficient allocation of services through a graph-based Vickrey auction as presented in Blau et al. [1], [2] we (i) develop a model of cooperation and show analytically that, in the overall non-cooperative setting at hand, our model of cooperation implements a mutual weakly dominant strategy for adjacent service providers to reduce the cost of communication by customizing their service offerings. Transferring our results into practice, we (ii) demonstrate the valuable properties of our model of cooperation by providing a comprehensive application scenario.
Starting Page	173
Ending Page	178
File Size	252025
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781457715426
DOI	10.1109/CEC.2011.29
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-09-05
Publisher Place	Luxembourg
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Context Provider Strategy Vickrey Auction Investments Service Value Networks Games Companies Credit cards Contract Cost accounting
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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