NDLI: Game based strategic bidding in pay as bid markets considering incomplete information and risk factor

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Mozdawar, A. Khaki, B. Asgari, M.H. Riahi, R.
Copyright Year	2009
Description	Author affiliation: Iran Grid Management Company (IGMC), Iran (Mozdawar, A.; Asgari, M.H.; Riahi, R.) \|\| Islamic Azad university, science and research branch, Iran (Khaki, B.)
Abstract	The strategic bidding problem for generation companies (GENCOs) in a pay as bid market is considered with respect to risk analysis for different participant types, in which GENCOs suffer of lack of complete information about opponents bidding strategies. According to Iran power market characteristics, in which participants should declare their maximum available energy to the ISO, Bertrand model is adopted for strategic bidding in the power market. Then, by transforming incomplete data that each GENCO has from others, into complete information using Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a proper method are proposed considering the power market characteristics, for maximization of GENCOs' profit according to the other GENCOs' bidding behaviors and power system operating conditions. Because of uncertainty of sources in a power system such as strategic behavior of opponent GENCOs, demand fluctuations and forced outage of network components, calculation of equilibrium point is not enough in proper strategic bidding, so the problem utilized so that risk factor is taken into account. The method is tested on a partial system, including five GENCOs, and the numerical results showed in detail the efficiency of the modeling and the proposed method of bidding behavior for generation companies.
Starting Page	255
Ending Page	260
File Size	177689
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424446117
DOI	10.1109/POWERENG.2009.4915197
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2009-03-18
Publisher Place	Portugal
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	ISO Power system management complete and incomplete games Nash equilibrium Optimal strategic bidding Bayesian Nash equilibrium Power system modeling Bertrand model Risk Management Bayesian methods GENCO competition Electricity supply industry Power markets Power systems Risk management Pay As Bid auction Power generation
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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