NDLI: ContrAuction: An integrated contract and auction design for dynamic spectrum sharing

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Lin Gao Jianwei Huang Ying-Ju Chen Biying Shou
Copyright Year	2012
Description	Author affiliation: Department of Information Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, HK (Lin Gao; Jianwei Huang) \|\| Department of Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, HK (Biying Shou) \|\| Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, University of California, Berkeley, 94720, USA (Ying-Ju Chen)
Abstract	Designing mechanisms with proper economic incentives is essential for the success of dynamic spectrum sharing, and market-driven secondary spectrum trading is one effective way to achieve this goal. In this paper, we consider secondary spectrum trading between one seller (i.e., the primary spectrum owner, PO) and multiple buyers (i.e., the secondary users, SUs) in a hybrid spectrum market with both guaranteed contract buyers (future market) and spot purchasing buyers (spot market).We focus on the PO's profit maximization with stochastic network information, and formulate the PO's expected profit maximization problem, where the optimal solution serves as a policy guiding the allocation of every spectrum under every possible information realization. We study systematically the optimal solutions under both information symmetry and information asymmetry, depending on whether the PO can observe the SUs' realized information. Under information symmetry, we show that the optimal solution (benchmark) maximizes both the PO's expected profit (optimality) and the social welfare (efficiency). Under information asymmetry, an incentive-compatible mechanism is necessary for eliciting the SUs' realized information. We propose the ContrAuction, an integrated contract and auction design, where the PO acts as virtual bidders (in addition to the role of an auctioneer) on behalf of the guaranteed contracts. We derive the optimal ContrAuction under the constraint of efficiency, and characterize the PO's expected profit loss (compared to that under information symmetry) induced by the information rent for the SUs.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	6
File Size	411315
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781467331395
e-ISBN	9781467331401
e-ISBN	9781467331388
DOI	10.1109/CISS.2012.6310751
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2012-03-21
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Economics Pricing Educational institutions Real-time systems Resource management Contracts Cost accounting
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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