NDLI: The "Value" of Reputation in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Cascella, R.G.
Copyright Year	2008
Description	Author affiliation: Trento Univ., Trento (Cascella, R.G.)
Abstract	Peer-to-peer networks need to have self-organization properties because of the lack of a centralized authority. This implies that nodes should self-manage and cooperate to sustain the availability of the resources in the system. In this context reputation management schemes have been proven in the past to be a useful tool to foster cooperation. In this paper we discuss the importance for a node to build and use its reputation value. We propose a game-theoretical framework, based on the generalized form of the Iterated prisoner's dilemma, to model the interactions of rational and selfish nodes in distributed systems. We study how a node takes into account the change of its reputation when deciding its behaviour in a transaction and discuss the Nash equilibrium in the system. Then, we also simulate nodes' interactions under different strategies to analyze how cooperation and reputation evolve in the system.
Starting Page	516
Ending Page	520
File Size	168337
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424414567
e-ISBN	9781424414574
DOI	10.1109/ccnc08.2007.120
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2008-01-10
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Peer to peer computing Economic forecasting Nash equilibrium Collaboration Evolution (biology) Communications technology Availability Context Analytical models Scalability
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

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