NDLI: Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Anari, N. Goel, G. Nikzad, A.
Copyright Year	2014
Description	Author affiliation: Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA, USA (Nikzad, A.) \|\| Univ. of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA (Anari, N.) \|\| Google, NY, USA (Goel, G.)
Abstract	In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk mturk, ClickWorker clickworker, CrowdFlower crowdflower. In these markets, there is a requester who wants to hire workers to accomplish some tasks. Each worker is assumed to give some utility to the requester on getting hired. Moreover each worker has a minimum cost that he wants to get paid for getting hired. This minimum cost is assumed to be private information of the workers. The question then is -- if the requester has a limited budget, how to design a direct revelation mechanism that picks the right set of workers to hire in order to maximize the requester's utility? We note that although the previous work (Singer (2010) chen et al. (2011)) has studied this problem, a crucial difference in which we deviate from earlier work is the notion of large-scale markets that we introduce in our model. Without the large market assumption, it is known that no mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio better than 0.414 and 0.5 for deterministic and randomized mechanisms respectively (while the best known deterministic and randomized mechanisms achieve an approximation ratio of 0.292 and 0.33 respectively). In this paper, we design a budget-feasible mechanism for large markets that achieves a competitive ratio of 1 - 1/e ≃ 0.63. Our mechanism can be seen as a generalization of an alternate way to look at the proportional share mechanism, which is used in all the previous works so far on this problem. Interestingly, we can also show that our mechanism is optimal by showing that no truthful mechanism can achieve a factor better than 1 - 1/e, thus, fully resolving this setting. Finally we consider the more general case of submodular utility functions and give new and improved mechanisms for the case when the market is large.
Sponsorship	IEEE Comput. Soc. Tech. Comm. Math. Found. Comput.
Starting Page	266
Ending Page	275
File Size	341200
Page Count	10
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781479965175
ISSN	02725428
DOI	10.1109/FOCS.2014.36
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2014-10-18
Publisher Place	USA
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Approximation methods Resource management Crowdsourcing Additives Standards Pricing Polynomials Budget-feasibility Truthful Mechanisms Large Markets
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An optimal 1-1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets (2014)

A truthful (1-ε)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets

An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets

Budget Feasible Mechanisms

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design

On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms

A Preliminary Implementation on Pricing Mechanisms for Electric Resource Control Markets

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets

Similar Documents

Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An optimal 1-1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets (2014)

A truthful (1-ε)-optimal mechanism for on-demand cloud resource provisioning

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets

An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets

Budget Feasible Mechanisms

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design

On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms

A Preliminary Implementation on Pricing Mechanisms for Electric Resource Control Markets

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets