NDLI: Research on quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under asymmetric information

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Zhang Lin Bai Shi-zhen Zhang Song-Tao
Copyright Year	2010
Description	Author affiliation: School of Management, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150076, China (Zhang Lin; Bai Shi-zhen; Zhang Song-Tao)
Abstract	Research on quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under asymmetric information can not only enlarge the theory of logistics service supply chain but also provide guidance for business practice. Considering a supply chain structure including a logistics service supplier and an integrator, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium model under asymmetric information is established based on a basic model of quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under symmetric information and an equilibrium result is obtained, then the influence on quality supervision is considered after a factor that the logistics service integrator will be punished is introduced and a new result of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is got. Simulation results show that the quality completion level of supplier rises up and the quality supervision level of integrator brings down after the factor is introduced. Therefore, in practice, the level of logistics service can be improved effectively and the overall quality of logistics services supply chain can be enhanced through strengthening the punishment of integrator.
Starting Page	15
Ending Page	19
File Size	288483
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424473311
e-ISBN	9781424473304
DOI	10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461479
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2010-01-09
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Logistics Service Supply Chain Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Costs Supply chain management Supply chains Nash equilibrium Subcontracting Bayesian methods Quality Supervision Manufacturing Contracts Asymmetric Information Logistics Quality management
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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