NDLI: Smart grid data integrity attacks: characterizations and $countermeasures^{π}$

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Giani, A. Bitar, E. Garcia, M. McQueen, M. Khargonekar, P. Poolla, K.
Copyright Year	2011
Description	Author affiliation: Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences, Univ of California, Berkeley, USA (Giani, A.; Poolla, K.) \|\| Mechanical Engineering, Univ of California, Berkeley, USA (Bitar, E.; Garcia, M.) \|\| Electrical and Computer Engineering, Univ of Florida, Gainesville, USA (Khargonekar, P.) \|\| Idaho National Labs., USA (McQueen, M.)
Abstract	Coordinated cyberattacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm in the power system state estimation process. These unobservable attacks present a potentially serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of line power meters is presented. This requires $O(n^{2}m)$ flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phasor measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks.
Starting Page	232
Ending Page	237
File Size	428057
Page Count	6
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781457717048
e-ISBN	9781457717024
e-ISBN	9781424496242
DOI	10.1109/SmartGridComm.2011.6102324
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-10-17
Publisher Place	Belgium
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Integrity attacks Synchro-phasors Transmission line measurements Phasor measurement units Vectors Cybersecurity Power systems Computer crime State estimation Energy management Observability Smart Grid
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

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