NDLI: Model of the ZI-C experiment for double auction system

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Liang, Li Xueying, Wang Guangyu, Cheng
Copyright Year	2011
Description	Author affiliation: School of Economics & Management University of Electronic Science and Technology of China Chengdu, China, 610054 (Liang, Li; Xueying, Wang; Guangyu, Cheng)
Abstract	Since Gode and Sunder had introduced zero intelligence with budget constraint (ZI-C) agents in the double auction experiments, there has much controversy in whether the pure market discipline in ZI-C system has the ability to let the transaction prices converge to the competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce a probability model to simulate the ZI experiences and try to gauge the power from the pure market. We analyze the ZI experiments, and explain the relationship between the price clearing process and the experimental settings. Our model quantifies the price convergent process, and the outputs are generally consistent with many well known ZI-C experiments. The results demonstrate that it is the mechanism of the ZI-C experiment that determines the price convergent process, and the auction market discipline itself has no predictive power as often believed.
Starting Page	1
Ending Page	5
File Size	195062
Page Count	5
File Format	PDF
ISBN	9781424486915
e-ISBN	9781424486946
DOI	10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5881340
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-05-06
Publisher Place	China
Access Restriction	Subscribed
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Economics Computers Computational modeling Humans Probability Double auction system Convergence ZI-C Competitive equilibrium Presses Simulation Model Artificial intelligence
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

Modeling intelligence of learning agents in an artificial double auction market

Double auction dynamics: structural consequences of non-binding price controls (1997).

An equilibrium pricing model for large scale computational markets

Research of Trust Model Personalized Dynamic Recommendation System Based on Auction Mechanism

©Copyright Hewlett-Packard Company 1997More Than Zero Intelligence Needed for Continuous Double-Auction Trading (1997)

An autonomous emotion model for virtual human

Using experiments to inform the privatization/deregulation movement in electricity (2002)

Tutorial: Artificial Intelligence And Simulation

Competitive equilibrium and the double auction

Model of the ZI-C experiment for double auction system

Similar Documents

Modeling intelligence of learning agents in an artificial double auction market

Double auction dynamics: structural consequences of non-binding price controls (1997).

An equilibrium pricing model for large scale computational markets

Research of Trust Model Personalized Dynamic Recommendation System Based on Auction Mechanism

©Copyright Hewlett-Packard Company 1997More Than Zero Intelligence Needed for Continuous Double-Auction Trading (1997)

An autonomous emotion model for virtual human

Using experiments to inform the privatization/deregulation movement in electricity (2002)

Tutorial: Artificial Intelligence And Simulation

Competitive equilibrium and the double auction

Model of the ZI-C experiment for double auction system