NDLI: Profit Incentive in Trading Nonexclusive Access on a Secondary Spectrum Market Through Contract Design

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Shang-Pin Sheng Mingyan Liu
Copyright Year	1993
Abstract	In this paper, we formulate a contract design problem where a primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers. It needs to determine how to optimally price the excess spectrum so as to maximize its profit, knowing that this excess capacity is stochastic in nature, does not come with exclusive access, and cannot provide deterministic service guarantees to a buyer. At the same time, buyers are of different types, characterized by different communication needs, tolerance for the channel uncertainty, and so on, all of which are a buyer's private information. The license holder must then try to design different contracts catered to different types of buyers in order to maximize its profit. We address this problem by adopting as a reference a traditional spectrum market where the buyer can purchase exclusive access with fixed/deterministic guarantees. We fully characterize the optimal solution in the cases where there is a single buyer type, and when multiple types of buyers share the same known channel condition as a result of the primary user activity. In the most general case, we construct an algorithm that generates a set of contracts in a computationally efficient manner and show that this set is optimal when the buyer types satisfy a monotonicity condition.
Sponsorship	IEEE Computer Society IEEE Communications Society Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Starting Page	1190
Ending Page	1203
Page Count	14
File Size	3910203
File Format	PDF
ISSN	10636692
Volume Number	22
Issue Number	4
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2014-01-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Bandwidth Licenses IEEE transactions Uncertainty Stochastic processes Numerical models secondary spectrum market Contracts incentives quality-of-service constraint
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Networks and Communications Electrical and Electronic Engineering Computer Science Applications Software

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4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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