NDLI: Investment and Pricing with Spectrum Uncertainty: A Cognitive Operator's Perspective

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Lingjie Duan Jianwei Huang Biying Shou
Copyright Year	2002
Abstract	This paper studies the optimal investment and pricing decisions of a cognitive mobile virtual network operator (C-MVNO) under spectrum supply uncertainty. Compared with a traditional MVNO who often leases spectrum via long-term contracts, a C-MVNO can acquire spectrum dynamically in short-term by both sensing the empty “spectrum holes” of licensed bands and dynamically leasing from the spectrum owner. As a result, a C-MVNO can make flexible investment and pricing decisions to match demands of the secondary unlicensed users. Compared to dynamic spectrum leasing, spectrum sensing is typically cheaper, but the obtained useful spectrum amount is random due to primary licensed users' stochastic traffic. The C-MVNO needs to determine the optimal amounts of spectrum sensing and leasing by evaluating the trade-off between cost and uncertainty. The C-MVNO also needs to determine the optimal price to sell the spectrum to the secondary unlicensed users, taking into account wireless heterogeneity of users such as different maximum transmission power levels and channel gains. We model and analyze the interactions between the C-MVNO and secondary unlicensed users as a Stackelberg game. We show several interesting properties of the network equilibrium, including threshold structures of the optimal investment and pricing decisions, the independence of the optimal price on users' wireless characteristics, and guaranteed fair and predictable QoS among users. We prove that these properties hold for general SNR regime and general continuous distributions of sensing uncertainty. We show that spectrum sensing can significantly improve the C-MVNO's expected profit and users' payoffs.
Sponsorship	IEEE Computer Society
Starting Page	1590
Ending Page	1604
Page Count	15
File Size	1532805
File Format	PDF
ISSN	15361233
Volume Number	10
Issue Number	11
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2011-11-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Sensors Bandwidth Games Pricing Investments Wireless sensor networks Signal to noise ratio Subgame Perfect equilibrium. Cognitive radio spectrum trading spectrum sensing dynamic spectrum leasing spectrum pricing Stackelberg game
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Computer Networks and Communications Electrical and Electronic Engineering Software

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4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
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