NDLI: An oligopolistic power market model with tradable NO/sub x/ permits

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Yihsu Chen Hobbs, B.F.
Copyright Year	1969
Abstract	Models formulated as complementarity problems have been applied previously to assess the potential for market power in transmission-constrained electricity markets. Here, we use the complementarity approach to simulate the interaction of pollution permit markets with electricity markets, considering forward contracts and the operating reserve market. Because some power producers are relatively large consumers of permits, there could be interaction between market power in the permits and energy markets. Market power in the energy market is modeled using a Cournot game, while a conjectured price response model is used in the permits market. An illustrative application is made to Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM), which we represent by a 14-node dc load-flow model, and the USEPA Ozone Transport Commission NO/sub x/ Budget Program. The results show that forward contracts effectively mitigate market power in PJM energy market and both simulated solutions of perfect and Cournot (oligopoly) competition are a good approximation to actual prices in 2000, except that the Cournot model yielded higher peak prices. The NO/sub x/ market influences the Cournot energy market in several ways. One is that Cournot competition lowers the price of NO/sub x/ permits, which in turn affects on low- and high-emission producers differently. In general, because pollution permits are an important cost, high concentration in the market for such permits can exacerbate the effects of market power in energy markets.
Sponsorship	IEEE Power Engineering Society
Starting Page	119
Ending Page	129
Page Count	11
File Size	483023
File Format	PDF
ISSN	08858950
Volume Number	20
Issue Number	1
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2005-02-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Power markets Costs Electricity supply industry Pollution Power generation economics Power system economics Environmental economics Forward contracts Oligopoly Production power transmission economics Air pollution complementarity Cournot economics game theory pollution power generation economics power market modeling
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Energy Engineering and Power Technology Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Sl.	Authority	Responsibilities	Communication Details
1	Ministry of Education (GoI), Department of Higher Education	Sanctioning Authority	https://www.education.gov.in/ict-initiatives
2	Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	Host Institute of the Project: The host institute of the project is responsible for providing infrastructure support and hosting the project	https://www.iitkgp.ac.in
3	National Digital Library of India Office, Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur	The administrative and infrastructural headquarters of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in
4	Project PI / Joint PI	Principal Investigator and Joint Principal Investigators of the project	Dr. B. Sutradhar bsutra@ndl.gov.in Prof. Saswat Chakrabarti will be added soon
5	Website/Portal (Helpdesk)	Queries regarding NDLI and its services	support@ndl.gov.in
6	Contents and Copyright Issues	Queries related to content curation and copyright issues	content@ndl.gov.in
7	National Digital Library of India Club (NDLI Club)	Queries related to NDLI Club formation, support, user awareness program, seminar/symposium, collaboration, social media, promotion, and outreach	clubsupport@ndl.gov.in
8	Digital Preservation Centre (DPC)	Assistance with digitizing and archiving copyright-free printed books	dpc@ndl.gov.in
9	IDR Setup or Support	Queries related to establishment and support of Institutional Digital Repository (IDR) and IDR workshops	idr@ndl.gov.in

An oligopolistic power market model with tradable NO permits (2005)

Impacts of tradable emission permits on oligopoly electricity market production under complete and incomplete information

Efficient determination of Cournot equilibria in electricity markets

Cournot Equilibrium Analysis for Spot and Forward Gaming in a Transmission Constrained Electricity Market

Market Power Exercised by Oligopolistic Generating Companies in Imperfect Electricity Markets

Strategic Behavior and Equilibrium in Experimental Oligopolistic Electricity Markets

A Study of the Transmission Price Conjecture in an Oligopolistic Power Market

A contribution in experimental economics to classify market power behaviors in an oligopolistic power market

Computing Two-settlement Equilibrium in a Transmission-Constrained Oligopolistic Electricity Market

An oligopolistic power market model with tradable NO/sub x/ permits

Similar Documents

An oligopolistic power market model with tradable NO permits (2005)

Impacts of tradable emission permits on oligopoly electricity market production under complete and incomplete information

Efficient determination of Cournot equilibria in electricity markets

Cournot Equilibrium Analysis for Spot and Forward Gaming in a Transmission Constrained Electricity Market

Market Power Exercised by Oligopolistic Generating Companies in Imperfect Electricity Markets

Strategic Behavior and Equilibrium in Experimental Oligopolistic Electricity Markets

A Study of the Transmission Price Conjecture in an Oligopolistic Power Market

A contribution in experimental economics to classify market power behaviors in an oligopolistic power market

Computing Two-settlement Equilibrium in a Transmission-Constrained Oligopolistic Electricity Market

An oligopolistic power market model with tradable NO/sub x/ permits