NDLI: Stochastic Control of Relay Channels With Cooperative and Strategic Users

Content Provider	IEEE Xplore Digital Library
Author	Vasal, D. Anastasopoulos, A.
Copyright Year	1972
Abstract	This paper studies node cooperation in a wireless network from the MAC layer perspective. A simple relay channel with a source, a relay, and a destination node is considered where the source can transmit a packet directly to the destination or transmit through the relay. The tradeoff between average energy and delay is studied by posing the problem as a stochastic dynamical optimization problem. The following two cases are considered: 1) nodes are cooperative and information is decentralized, and 2) nodes are strategic and information is centralized. With decentralized information and cooperative nodes, a structural result is proven that the optimal policy is the solution of a Bellman-type fixed-point equation over a time invariant state space. For specific cost functions reflecting transmission energy consumption and average delay, numerical results are presented showing that a policy found by solving this fixed-point equation outperforms conventionally used time-division multiple access (TDMA) and random access (RA) policies. When nodes are strategic and information is common knowledge, it is shown that cooperation can be induced by exchange of payments between the nodes, imposed by the network designer such that the socially optimal Markov policy corresponding to the centralized solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the resulting dynamic game.
Starting Page	3434
Ending Page	3446
Page Count	13
File Size	683400
File Format	PDF
ISSN	00906778
Volume Number	62
Issue Number	10
Language	English
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Publisher Date	2014-01-01
Publisher Place	U.S.A.
Access Restriction	One Nation One Subscription (ONOS)
Rights Holder	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subject Keyword	Relays Delays Markov processes Games Equations History Cost function subgame perfect equilibrium Cooperative communication relay channel MAC stochastic control Markov decision process dynamic game
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Article
Subject	Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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