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Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements
| Content Provider | EconStor |
|---|---|
| Author | Carraro, Carlo Eyckmans, Johan Finus, Michael |
| Abstract | The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty. |
| File Format | |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
| Publisher Date | 2005-01-01 |
| Publisher Place | Milano |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Rights Holder | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
| Subject Keyword | Self-enforcing international environmental agreements Climate policy Transfers Umweltabkommen Klimaschutz Internationaler Transfer Welt Noncooperative Games Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
