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Public Versus Secret Reserve Prices in eBay Auctions: Results from a Pokmon Field Experiment Rama Katkar and David Lucking-Reiley (2000)
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | July, First Version Katkar, Rama Lucking-Reiley, David |
| Description | Sellers in eBay auctions have the opportunity to choose both a public minimum bid amount and a secret reserve price. We ask, empirically, whether the seller is made better or worse off by setting a secret reserve above a low minimum bid, versus the option of making the reserve public by using it as the minimum bid level. In a field experiment, we auction 50 matched pairs of Pokmon cards on eBay, half with secret reserves and half with equivalently high public minimum bids. We find that secret reserve prices make us worse off as sellers, by reducing the probability of the auction resulting in a sale, deterring serious bidders from entering the auction, and lowering the expected transaction price of the auction. We also present evidence that some sellers choose to use secret reserve prices for reasons other than increasing their expected auction prices. |
| File Format | |
| Language | English |
| Publisher Date | 2000-01-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Pokmon Card Pokmon Field Experiment Rama Katkar Matched Pair Reserve Public Auction Price Low Minimum Bid Secret Reserve Public Versus Secret Reserve Price Public Minimum Bid Amount David Lucking-reiley Secret Reserve Price Minimum Bid Level Serious Bidder High Public Minimum Bid Field Experiment Ebay Auction Expected Transaction Price |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
