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RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH SUBJECTIVE PEER EVALUATIONS
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | De, Joyee Liz, Jin Mukherjeex, Arijit |
| Abstract | Abstract. We study optimal contracting in a setting where a rm repeatedly interacts with multiple workers, and can compensate them based on publicly available performance signals as well as privately reported peer evaluations. If the evaluation and the e¤ort provision are done by di¤erent workers (as in a supervisor/agent hierarchy), we show that, using both the private and public signals, the rst best can be achieved even in a static setting. However, if each worker is required to both exert e¤ort and report on his co-workers performance (as in a team setting), the workers e¤ort incentives cannot be decoupled from this truth-telling incentives. This makes the optimal static contract ine ¢ cient and relational contracts based on the public signals increase e ¢ ciency. In the optimal contract, it may be optimal to ignore signals that are informative of the workers e¤ort. 1. |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Relational Contract Subjective Peer Evaluation Public Signal Ort Provision Static Setting Available Performance Signal Di Erent Worker Multiple Worker Team Setting Truth-telling Incentive Exert Ort Optimal Contract Supervisor Agent Hierarchy Optimal Contracting Relational Contract Co-worker Performance Peer Evaluation Optimal Static Contract Ine Cient Ort Incentive |
| Content Type | Text |
