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Subgame-perfection in stochastic games with perfect information and recursive payoffs (2008).
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Flesch, János Kuipers, Jeroen Schoenmakers, Gijs Vrieze, Koos |
| Abstract | We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing state. With respect to the expected average reward, we provide a constructive proof that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium exists in pure strategies, for every ε> 0. More-over, if all transitions of a game in our class are deterministic, then the game has a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies. |
| File Format | |
| Publisher Date | 2008-01-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Stochastic Game Perfect Information Recursive Payoff Pure Strategy Average Reward Absorbing State Non-absorbing State Perfect Information Game Subgame-perfect Equilibrium Exists Subgame-perfect Equilibrium Constructive Proof Subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium N-player Stochastic Game Recursive Game |
| Content Type | Text |
