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The computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting.
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Narodytska, Nina |
| Abstract | Abstract. In many real world elections, agents are not required to rank all candidates. We study three of the most common meth-ods used to modify voting rules to deal with such partial votes. These methods modify scoring rules (like the Borda count), elimi-nation style rules (like single transferable vote) and rules based on the tournament graph (like Copeland) respectively. We argue that with an elimination style voting rule like single transferable vote, partial voting does not change the situations where strategic voting is possible. However, with scoring rules and rules based on the tourna-ment graph, partial voting can increase the situations where strategic voting is possible. As a consequence, the computational complexity of computing a strategic vote can change. For example, with Borda count, the complexity of computing a strategic vote can decrease or stay the same depending on how we score partial votes. 1 |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Partial Vote Strategic Voting Computational Impact Strategic Vote Borda Count Single Transferable Vote Partial Voting Computational Complexity Common Meth-ods Scoring Rule Elimination Style Voting Rule Elimi-nation Style Rule Tourna-ment Graph Many Real World Election Tournament Graph Voting Rule |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
