2006 Cognitive continuity in primate social cognition (1996)

Content Provider	CiteSeerX
Researcher	Gallese, Vittorio Aless, Maria
Description	What are the mechanisms enabling primates to display their complex social skills? And in particular, what makes humans different? A common view prefigures a sharp distinction be-tween humans as mind readers and all nonhuman primates species, confined to behavior reading. This distinction is held to be the result of a discontinuity in the evolution of social cognition. We challenge this view by positing that behavior reading and mind reading may not constitute two autonomous, encapsulated realms. Apparently different cognitive strategies may be underpinned by similar functional mechanisms, which in the course of evolution acquire increasing complexity and are exapted to sustain more sophisticated new cognitive skills. We discuss the role of mirror neurons in monkeys and humans in relation to the ascription of intentions to others as a paradig-matic case in support of our thesis of a cognitive continuity within the evolution of primate social cognition. Against the “Ptolemaic ” Paradigm Primates, and particularly human beings, are social animals whose cognitive development capitalizes upon the interac-tion with other conspecifics (see Barrett and Henzi 2005). During social interactions we manifest our inner intentions and thoughts by means of overt behavior, while simultane-ously trying to figure out what are the intentions and thoughts of others, when witnessing their behavior. Detecting another agent’s intentions helps anticipating this agent’s future actions, which may be cooperative, noncooperative, or even threaten-ing. Accurate understanding and anticipation enable the ob-server to adjust his or her responses appropriately (see Byrne ∗Corresponding author.
File Format	PDF
Language	English
Publisher	University Press
Publisher Date	1996-01-01
Publisher Institution	In Attention and performance XIX (eds
Access Restriction	Open
Subject Keyword	Complex Social Skill Ptolemaic Paradigm Primate Byrne Corresponding Author Similar Functional Mechanism Primate Social Cognition Behavior Reading Common View Overt Behavior Future Action Nonhuman Primate Specie Sharp Distinction Be-tween Human Accurate Understanding Social Cognition Inner Intention Sophisticated New Cognitive Skill Mirror Neuron Cognitive Continuity Different Cognitive Strategy Mind Reader Social Interaction Agent Intention Cognitive Development Mind Reading Paradig-matic Case Encapsulated Realm Human Being Social Animal
Content Type	Text
Resource Type	Thesis