Loading...
Please wait, while we are loading the content...
Similar Documents
Fiscal policy in a monetary union in the presence of uncertainty about the central bank preferences (2008).
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Dai, Meixing Sidiropoulos, Moise Meixing Dai, A. Moise Sidiropoulos, B. |
| Abstract | Abstract: In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and decentralized supply-side fiscal policies in a monetary union. We find that the opacity of a conservative CCB has a restrictive effect on national fiscal policies since each government internalizes the influence of its actions on the common monetary policy and thus reinforces the disciplinary effect of institutional constraints such as the Stability and Growth Pact on national fiscal authorities. However, more opacity could imply higher inflation and unemployment when the union is large enough and induce higher inflation and output-gap variability. An enlargement of the union incites national governments to increase tax rate, and weakens the disciplinary effects of opacity on member countries if fiscal policymaking is relatively decentralized and the CCB quite conservative. It induces an increase in the level of inflation and unemployment, and could increase inflation and output-gap variability. |
| File Format | |
| Publisher Date | 2008-01-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Monetary Union Fiscal Policy Central Bank Preference Disciplinary Effect Output-gap Variability National Fiscal Authority National Fiscal Policy Conservative Ccb Common Monetary Policy Institutional Constraint Restrictive Effect National Government Common Central Bank Member Country Political Transparency Fiscal Policymaking Tax Rate Growth Pact Supply-side Fiscal Policy |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |