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Theoretical Economics 4 (2009), 127–163 1555-7561/20090127 Strategy-proofness and single-crossing
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Saporiti, Alejandro |
| Abstract | This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n − 1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals ’ most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. It also offers a strategic foundation for the so-called “single-crossing version ” of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences. |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Single-crossing Preference Strategic Foundation Strategy-proof Collective Choice Rule Theoretical Economics Tops-only Property Social Choice Rule Direct Mechanism Median Voter Theorem Dominant Strategy True Preference So-called Single-crossing Version Social Alternative Median Ideal Point Preferred Alternative Strategy-proofness Implies Maximal Single-crossing Domain Extended Median Rule |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
