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Social capital, reputation, and tacit knowledge: Use of board of directors to create and sustain a knowledge-based competitive advantage
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Enkel, Ellen Goel, Sanjay |
| Abstract | Academic Track PaperSocial capital, reputation, and tacit knowledge: Use of board of directors to create and sustain a knowledge-based competitive advantage In this paper we build on the growing body of research on social capital, reputation, and knowledge management to develop testable propositions with respect to a firm’s board of directors and their use in creating and sustaining a knowledge-based competitive advantage. A firm’s board of directors is a specific and unique group of actors available to knowledge-based firms as embodiments of social capital, providers of reputation, and producers of tacit knowledge. The choice of members of this group is a strategic (because of its inherent idiosyncratic character) choice made by the firm. We argue that a firm’s board potentially offers a significant source of social capital that can be leveraged with other strategic and non-strategic assets of the company. In addition, a board’s reputation is a strategic knowledge asset, that can be leveraged via social capital for strategic consequences. Finally, firms that have mechanisms to use their board’s social capital, and leverage it with their employees ’ social capital will report better |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Employee Social Capital Social Capital Non-strategic Asset Strategic Consequence Significant Source Academic Track Papersocial Capital Tacit Knowledge Board Reputation Knowledge-based Competitive Advantage Inherent Idiosyncratic Character Testable Proposition Strategic Knowledge Asset Knowledge-based Firm Unique Group |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
