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2011): “Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence,” forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Hörner, Johannes Hörner Lovo, Stefano |
| Abstract | We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players ’ continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations. |
| File Format | |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Sequential Equilibrium Belief-free Equilibrium Belief-free Equilibrium Payoff Player Continuation Strategy Economic Theory Incomplete Information Two-player Game |
| Content Type | Text |