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Is there a “depth versus participation ” dilemma in international cooperation? (2011).
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Bernauer, Thomas Kalbhenn, Anna Koubi, Vally Spilker, Gabriele |
| Abstract | Abstract: Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation ” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this assumption is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. We do, however, observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty |
| File Format | |
| Publisher Date | 2011-01-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Depth Versus Participation Dilemma International Cooperation Dispute Settlement Mechanism Design Characteristic International Agreement Assistance Provision Substantial Positive Effect Cooperative Effort International Cooperative Effort Participation-limiting Effect Organizational Structure Enforcement Mechanism International Politics Claim Relies Positive Incentive Empirical Testing Global Environmental Treaty International Relation Literature Positive Effect |
| Content Type | Text |
| Resource Type | Article |
