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Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines (2009).
| Content Provider | CiteSeerX |
|---|---|
| Author | Mierendorff, Konrad |
| Abstract | A dynamic mechanism design problem with multi-dimensional private information is studied. There is one object and two buyers who arrive in two different periods. In addition to his privately known valuation, the first buyer also has a privately known deadline for purchasing the object. The seller wants to maximize revenue. Depending on the type distribution, the incentive compatibility constraint for the deadline may or may not be binding in the optimal mechanism. Sufficient conditions on the type distribution and examples are given for either case. An optimal mechanism for the binding case is derived. It can be implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two. The asymmetry prevails even if the valuations of both buyers are identically distributed. In order to prevent buyer one from buying in the first period when his deadline is two, the seller sets a reserve price that is lower than in the classical (Myerson, 1981) optimal auction and gives him a (non-linear) bonus. The bonus leads to robust bunching at the top of the type-space. The optimal mechanism can be characterized in terms of generalized virtual valuations which depend endogenously on the allocation rule. |
| File Format | |
| Publisher Date | 2009-01-01 |
| Access Restriction | Open |
| Subject Keyword | Optimal Mechanism Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design Type Distribution Sufficient Condition First Buyer Optimal Auction Multi-dimensional Private Information Fixed Price Different Period Asymmetric Auction First Period Binding Case Reserve Price Allocation Rule Virtual Valuation Incentive Compatibility Constraint Dynamic Mechanism Design Problem |
| Content Type | Text |